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ABSTRACT
In this study, I investigated the relationship 
between financial slack, its reduction, and per-
formance for small-sized Japanese firms in two 
specific periods of the Great Recession. The first 
period extended from the summer of 2008 to the 
middle of 2009, when many companies dramati-
cally lowered their performance. The other peri-
od extended from the middle of 2009 to the end 
of 2010, when many firms gradually improved 
their performance. I also examined the effects 
of reduced financial slack at the early stage of 
a recession on a firm’s performance during the 
later stage of a recession. I consequently found 
that financial slack does not work as a buffer 
during the initial shock period of a recession, 
and that a reduction of financial slack during 
the initial stage of a recession has a positive 
impact on performance improvement during the 
later stage. The presence of financial slack has a 
significantly negative influence on a firm’s per-
formance during the initial stage of a recession, 
and it has little effect on a firm’s performance at 
the later stage. In fact, the relationship between 
financial slack reduction and performance dur-
ing the later stage of a recession is curvilinear, 
and the findings of this study have implications 
for managers affected by deep recessions.
INTRODUCTION
Some scholars consider financial slack, includ-
ing excess cash and borrowing capacity, to be 
instrumental in enhancing the performance of 
firms that face environmental turbulence, such 
as economic recessions （e.g., Chakrabarti, 2015; 
Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Latham & Braun, 2008; 
Shephard & Wiklund, 2011; Zona, 2012）. Oth-
ers regard financial slack as a hindrance to a 
firm’s performance because financial slack can 
insulate managers from such turbulence, slow-
ing down a firm’s reaction （e.g., Yasai-Ardekani, 
1986）. Empirical evidence is consequently mixed 
（e.g., Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari & Turner, 2004: 
Latham & Braun, 2008）. One possible reason 
for such disagreement is that previous studies 
focused mainly on the “presence” of slack at the 
beginning of an environmental disruption. Con-
sequently, those scholars have not taken into 
account the possibility of slack being reduced （or 
used） for the duration of that disruption. 
Although the presence of slack at the onset 
of a recession would seem to give firms cer-
tain competitive advantages, slack needs to 
be reduced （or used） to combat recessions. 
In fact, financial slack resources provide dis-
cretionary funding to pursue new projects, 
improve processes, and develop new products 
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Meier, 2009）. Hence, financial slack needs to be 
converted into cash and other resources, and 
it must be spent to obtain resources that are 
critical to performance improvements during 
a recession. Moreover, deploying competitive 
resources through slack reduction takes time, 
so the impact of slack reduction on performance 
does not materialize at once. Thus, the presence 
of slack at the onset of a recession and the sub-
sequent implementation of slack reduction will 
impact a firm’s performance during different 
stages of a recession. 
Most recessions last more than a few years, 
and from the start, they have sudden, damaging 
effects on many companies. These effects are 
followed by an eventual improvement. However, 
many studies assume that the levels of financial 
slack at the onset of a recession tend to deter-
mine a firm’s performance during every stage 
of a recession: i.e., the declining and recovery 
periods. For example, Latham and Braun （2008） 
designed their framework in such a way that 
the levels of financial slack at the onset of the 
information technology （IT） recession of 2001 
determined the performance of firms until the 
end of the recession in 2003. In other words, 
they treated financial slack as a time invari-
ant. In reality, though, managers could use or 
increase their financial slack in order to respond 
to pressures from a recession. Thus, financial 
slack should be treated as a time variant. 
Slack is usually considered a buffer against 
environmental turbulence （Palzelt, etc., 2008; 
Wan & Yiu, 2009; Youngsang & Ployhart, 2014）, 
but its buffering effects do not last forever. 
Firms that have enough financial slack at the 
onset of a recession have opportunities to fare 
well during that initial decline. However, among 
those same firms, some reduce their slack lev-
els substantially, while others maintain their 
slack levels. Therefore, the amount of slack at 
the onset of a recession may be irrelevant to a 
firm’s performance during, for example, the sec-
ond year of that recession. This is because some 
companies would have spent their slack resourc-
es to prepare for performance improvements, 
while others would have kept or increased these 
slack resources to avoid bankruptcies. 
Managers who have enough slack when a 
recession suddenly hits often take advantage of 
that slack. However, they do not know if it is 
advantageous to use financial slack resources 
to improve their within-recession performance 
because little research exists on the role of 
financial slack reductions in the event of a reces-
sion. Therefore, it is important to determine if 
firms that have reduced their slack resources 
at the beginning of a recession fare better than 
those that have not reduced their slack levels 
by the later stage of a recession. 
This research study is an attempt to further 
our understanding of the nature, characteristics, 
and impact of slack and slack reduction on the 
performance of firms during the first few years 
of the Great Recession of 2008. The Great Reces-
sion started in the summer of 2008, and the ini-
tial shock it had on many companies lasted until 
the spring/summer of 2009. Thereafter, the 
performance of these firms gradually improved. 
Thus, the Great Recession provides relatively 
clear stages of recession: i.e., the declining and 
performance improvement stages, and offers an 
ideal setting for measuring and analyzing the 
impact of slack and slack reduction.
In this study, I employed a longitudinal 
design with a hierarchical linear model （HLM） 
approach. This relatively new tool provides a 
very flexible research design to measure and 
analyze the precise impact of slack （at a reces-
sion’s onset） and slack reduction over a firm’s 
performance “trajectories.” I applied this tool to 
small-sized electronics firms in Japan because 
the Great Recession severely affected most of 
those companies. Yet, past studies have typi-
cally analyzed slack‒performance relationships 
for large-scale, publicly-held companies （e.g., Ma 
& Karri, 2009; Tan & Peng, 2004）, and those 
studies have seldom examined small-sized com-
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panies. Furthermore, small-sized companies （i.e., 
employing 20 to 200 individuals） probably pres-
ent a better sampling frame to test the HLM 
approach and its associated hypotheses. This 
is because recessions rapidly affect the perfor-
mance of small-sized firms. Many large-sized 
companies, on the other hand, can withstand 
recessionary impact for long periods of time: i.e., 
six months to a year, perhaps because of their 
financial and market strengths. In fact, in their 
financial statements, many large-sized firms 
did not show the negative impact of the Great 
Recession for more than a year. Therefore, mea-
suring the performance trajectories of large-
sized companies using the HLM approach would 
be problematic.
There is also an important practical reason 
for studying small-sized firms in Japan. These 
companies are, by far, the most common form of 
Japanese business organization, generating more 
than 50% of all the jobs in the country （Japan 
Small Business Research Institute, 2012）. Yet, 
despite their ubiquity, small-sized companies 
tend to be overlooked by management scholars, 
probably because data about small-sized com-
panies are not readily available. Moreover, most 
prior studies concerning the slack‒performance 
link have focused on larger companies in the 
U.S. and Europe （e.g., Ma & Karri, 2009; Tan & 
Peng, 2004）.
The purpose of this study is to investigate the 
nature and impact of financial slack and slack 
reduction on different stages of a recession. Spe-
cifically, I examined if the presence of financial 
slack at the onset of a recession impacted the 
performance of small-sized Japanese firms dur-
ing the initial shock of the Great Recession, and 
if financial slack reduction conducted during 
the initial stage of that recession had significant 
impact on the performance improvements of 
those firms at the later stage. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Relationship between Financial Slack and 
Performance
Slack has been defined as “the pool of 
resources in an organization that is in excess 
of the minimum necessary to produce a given 
level of organizational output” （Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996, p. 1246）. Firms with substantial 
slack have fewer resource allocation problems 
（due to resource availability） （Cyert & March, 
1963） and improved information processing 
（due to reduced interdependencies between 
subunits） （Galbraith, 1973）. Thus, these firms 
have more innovation capabilities （Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996）. However, previous studies on the 
relationship between slack and performance 
have presented mixed results. Some studies （e.g., 
Bourgeois, 1981; Latham & Braun, 2008） have 
found positive relationships between slack and 
performance, while others （e.g., Simon, 1997; 
Yasai-Ardekani, 1986） have found no relation-
ship between them or negative relationships. 
Furthermore, traditional research on slack has 
assumed that the presence of slack creates an 
organizational atmosphere that promotes inno-
vation and organizational performance （e.g., 
Thomson & Miller, 2001）. The opposite view is 
supported by agency theory, which posits that 
managers with excess cash flow （i.e., one of the 
slack resources） tend to run their organizations 
ineffectively （e.g., Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2009）. 
Neither of the above views usually takes into 
account the impact of slack reduction on per-
formance. In normal circumstances, managers 
do not consider reducing slack because slack 
reduction may lead to infighting for resources 
between departments, thereby failing to sup-
port an organizational atmosphere conductive 
to creativity and coordination （e.g., Thomson 
& Millar, 2001）. Thus, in normal circumstances, 
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it may not be prudent to reduce organizational 
slack.
Financial slack is one type of organizational 
slack, and it represents the cash and the bor-
rowing capacity of a firm. Financial slack has 
been considered a buffer for environmental 
turbulence, such as economic recessions （Bour-
geois, 1981; Cheng & Kesner, 1997）. Therefore, 
in times of recession, firms may reduce slack to 
maintain or improve their performance. 
Financial Slack and Performance at the Early 
Stage of Recession
Recessions represent one of the most damag-
ing exogenous shocks to a company`s survival 
and profitability （Mascarenhas and Asker, 
1989）. Some recessions affect certain industries, 
such as the IT recession of 2001, while other 
severe recessions, like the Great Recession of 
2008, distress many economic sectors. Moreover, 
when a recession hits, it is almost impossible to 
forecast the recession’s end. This uncertainty 
puts tremendous pressures on managers, and 
a firm’s excess financial resources could offer a 
critical advantage in the firm’s survival. 
Financial slack can act as a buffer against 
recessionary conditions. Financial slack may 
be a “rainy day” fund, and firms with more 
financial slack respond differently to recession-
ary conditions （having greater flexibility in the 
application and adaption of the slack resources） 
than those with fewer financial resources 
（Latham & Braun, 2008）. Therefore, we would 
expect financial slack to mitigate negative reces-
sionary effects on firm performance. However, 
past studies have found that the presence of 
financial slack had a significantly negative 
impact on performance at the initial stage of 
the IT recession （e.g., Latham & Braun, 2008）. 
Yet, financial slack had a significantly positive 
influence on performance at the recovery stage 
（e.g., Latham & Braun, 2008）. So, financial slack 
protects firms from recession and leads to sub-
optimal performance at the beginning of a reces-
sion. But, at the later stage, Latham and Braun 
（2008: 45） argued that financial slack may help 
managers speed up recovery and secure a post-
recessionary head start. For Latham and Braun 
（2008）, financial slack provides companies with 
opportunities in building long-term competitive 
advantages.
Still, another argument for the above Latham 
and Braun’s （2008） findings may be that the 
slack‒performance link at the early stage of 
a recession could be curvilinear. It is well-
documented that slack‒performance relation-
ship tends to be curvilinear: i.e., an inverted U 
shape （e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Nohria & Gulati, 
1996; Herold, D. M., Jayaraman, N. & Narayanas-
wamy, C.R., 2006）. This means that firms with 
too much or too little slack are likely to have 
less performance than companies with medium 
levels of slack. Yet, there may be a limit to the 
incremental performance contribution of slack 
presence, and departure from the optimal point 
may lead to reduced performance. Thus, the fol-
lowing hypothesis can be set forth:
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between 
financial slack and firm performance at the 
early stage of a recession is curvilinear: i.e., 
too much or too little financial slack has a 
negative impact on performance, and a mod-
erate level of financial slack has a positive 
impact on performance.
Financial Slack Reduction and Performance at 
the Later Stage of Recession
Prior studies have investigated the impact 
of slack reduction on a firm’s innovation （e.g., 
Mellahi & Wilkinson, 2010）. Most of these stud-
ies have examined slack reduction in terms of 
human resources （e.g., Cheng & Kesner, 1997; 
Luan, Tien & Chi, 2013; Mellahi & Wilkinson, 
2010; Wagan, 1998; Youngsang & Ployhart, 
2014）. Many firms have gone through downsiz-
ing in the past decades, and some researchers 
have investigated the impact of downsizing on 
human and organizational capital on companies’ 
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innovative capabilities. 
Although no studies exist concerning the 
effects of financial slack reduction on perfor-
mance, it would be reasonable to expect a 
positive relationship between the two. Since 
financial slack is largely unabsorbed in an orga-
nization, financial slack reduction would not 
trigger an organization resistance. However, 
since absorbed slack, like excess employees, is 
already absorbed into an organization, such a 
slack reduction would cause the organizational 
atmosphere to worsen （e.g., Cheng & Kesner, 
1997; Wagan, 1998）.
Arguments against slack reduction during 
recessions are related to the high risks of reduc-
ing liquidity during hard times, which may lead 
to bankruptcies. To obtain safe levels of liquid-
ity, some managers may become risk averse, 
even to the point of sacrificing their firm’s effi-
ciency （Campello, et al, 2011）. This may lead 
to another argument; too much financial slack 
reduction could lead to unsafe levels of liquid-
ity and, consequently, to an inefficient use of 
resources. Moreover, too little financial slack 
reduction may have a insignificant impact on 
performance. Thus, a curvilinear relationship is 
expected to exist between financial slack reduc-
tion and performance. In fact, some prior studies 
on the relationships between the reduction of 
slack （e.g., excess employees） and performance 
found curvilinear relationships （e.g., Greenley 
& Oktemgh, 1998）. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis can be set forth:
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between 
financial slack reduction at a recession’s 
onset and a firm’s performance at the later 
stage of a recession is curvilinear: i.e., too 
much or too little financial slack reduction 
has a negative impact on performance, and 
a moderate level of financial slack reduction 
has a positive impact on performance. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Sample 
Sample firms included small-sized Japanese 
manufacturers of electronics. A questionnaire 
was sent to top executives of those companies 
during the spring of 2012. The sample compa-
nies were randomly selected from the Tokyo 
Shouko Research （TSR） Corporate Data Direc-
tory. 
Each respondent was asked to indicate if he/
she was familiar with his/her company’s experi-
ence during the Great Recession, in terms of its 
operations and strategies conducted from 2008 
to 2010. If not, he/she was asked to send the 
questionnaire to a person who was knowledge-
able of the experience. A total of 403 question-
naires were sent to top executives. After one 
follow-up letter, 140 useable responses were 
received （about a 35% response rate）. Nineteen 
responses were excluded because these firms 
had more than 200 employees. A total of 121 
responses were used for analysis. Furthermore, 
to assess nonresponse bias, the characteristics 
of the responding companies were compared 
to those of the non-responding companies. The 
use of chi-square analysis confirmed that survey 
respondents did not significantly differ （p = .05） 
from non-respondents on any of the three fac-
tors for data collection: annual sales, the number 
of employees, and the number of years since 
incorporation. Average firms in the sample had 
about 80 employees and existed for 19 years 
since incorporation. The number of employees 
ranged from 20 to 200.
Dependent Variable
I used two measures of performance in this 
study: profit （ROA） and overall performance, 
and I used a self-report subjective instrument 
to measure the profit and overall performance. 
For each measure of performance, respondents 
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identified whether their company （compared to 
similar-sized companies in the same region and 
industry） was in the top 20% of firms （scale = 
5）, the upper 20‒40% of firms （scale = 4）, and 
so on. They were asked to provide their assess-
ment of each quarterly result, from the third 
quarter of 2008 to the third quarter of 2010.
Dess and Robinson’s （1984） study supports 
the usefulness of subjective performance mea-
sures in the absence of objective performance 
measures. Past studies （Wall, et al, 2004; Singh, 
1986） have used similar subjective performance 
measures as well. These studies tend to confirm 
that the perceived performance measures are a 
reasonably accurate measure for actual perfor-
mance. I also summed these two performance 
measures into a composite scale for a firm’s per-
formance.
Independent Variables
I used two items for the financial slack of a 
firm and its financial slack reduction: excess 
cash and excess borrowing capacity. Using a 
five-point scale, ranging from one （strongly 
disagree） to five （strongly agree）, top execu-
tives were asked to assess the extent to which 
their firms had plenty of excess cash and excess 
borrowing capacity at the onset of the Great 
Recession: i.e., the third quarter of 2008. They 
were also asked to assess the extent to which 
their companies reduced their excess cash and 
borrowing capacity levels during the first year 
after the Great Recession had begun. These 
questions were combined to represent the finan-
cial slack and financial slack reduction measures.
Control Variables
I controlled two different factors that may 
lead to changes in a firm’s performance dur-
ing a recession: firm size and the severity of 
performance decline. Firm size has been found 
to affect the ability of firms to make necessary 
changes in the face of environmental turbu-
lence （Tushman & Romanelli, 1985）. The log of 
employees at the onset of the Great Recession 
determined the firm size.
Previous research （Bibeault, 1982） suggests 
that the severity of performance decline may 
influence the degree of performance turnaround. 
Specifically, the more severe the performance 
decline, the more likely it is that subsequent 
performance improvement will occur. Respon-
dents were asked to assess the extent to which 
the Great Recession affected their industry and 
their firm, with answers ranging from one （not 
affected at all） to five （strongly, negatively 
affected）. I summed the responses to these two 
questions to represent the perceived severity of 
the recession
Approach to Data Analysis
I used hierarchical growth modeling to deter-
mine factors that affected company performance 
during the early and later stages of recession. 
Hierarchical growth modeling has been dem-
onstrated to be an effective statistical tool for 
examining trends （Raudenbush & Bryk, 1992）. 
I also used HLM because this statistical proce-
dure can unveil how time-invariant predictor 
（i.e., slack present at the onset of a recession） 
and time-varying predictor （i.e., slack reduction） 
are related to performance trajectories over 
time. Individual growth HLMs are typically con-
ceptualized as two-level modes. The first level 
of the model includes linear and quadratic com-
ponents that examine the trends of company 
performance:
ROAi =  β 0 + β1 （LINEAR） + β2 （QUADRATIC） 
+ error, 
where the linear trend corresponds with the 
rate of decline, and the quadratic component 
corresponds with the rate of recovery. 
In the second level of the HLM, I entered 
independent and control variables to determine 
which variables affected the firms’ performance 
trends:
•  β 0 （INTERCEPT） = γ 00 + γ 01（SLACK） +  
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γ 02 （SEVERITY） + γ 03 （SIZE） + error;
•  β 1 （LINEAR） = γ 00 + γ 01 （SLACK） +  
γ 02（SEVERITY） + γ 03 （SIZE） + error; and
•  β 2 （QUADRATIC） = γ 00 + γ 01 （SLACK 
REDUCTION） + γ 02 （SEVERITY） +  
γ 03（SIZE） + error.
In the intercept and linear models, “SLACK” 
is the amount of slack that was present at 
the onset of the Great Recession. Yet, in the 
quadratic model, the variable is the amount of 
“SLACK REDUCTION” that occurred during 
the first year in the Great Recession. To exam-
ine the curvilinear relationship between slack 
and performance, I added slack squared to each 
model.
RESULTS
The first HLM model was an empty model, 
allowing examination of variance in performance 
without reference to any predictor variables. 
The performance intercept was specified as a 
random effect. The model was used to calcu-
late the intra-class correlation coefficient （ICC）, 
which indicates the proportion of total vari-
ability in the dependent variable. The ICC for 
performance was .27, indicating that 27% of the 
variance in performance could be attributed 
to inter-firm differences, while 73% of variance 
was at the intra-firm level. A chi-square test of 
the intercept variance component indicated that 
a proportion of inter-firm variability in perfor-
mance was statistically significant, χ 2（N=121）
=615, p<.001. Given this result, I introduced 
level-2 predictors （Snijders and Bosker, 1999）.
The next HLM model included only linear 
and quadratic trajectory parameters as level-1 
predictors. Examination of their variance compo-
nents indicated that significant variance existed 
between firms for both the linear, χ 2（N = 121） 
= 435.95, p < .001, and quadratic, χ 2（N = 121） 
= 407.59, p < .001, trajectories. This model also 
indicated that the fixed effect coefficients for 
the linear and quadratic trajectory parameters 
were significant, b = -.70, t = -17.39, p < .001, 
and b = .07, t = 15.15, p < .001, respectively （See 
Table 1）. This suggests that average firms in 
the sample showed a rapid drop in performance 
at the onset of the recession, with a modest rate 
of recovery during the recession’s later stage.
Table 2 presents the results of the second 
level of HLM trend analysis. The analysis exam-
ined which firm-specific factors and control 
variables impacted the performance trajectories. 
With regard to financial slack, I did not find 
support for Hypothesis 1 （See Models 1, and 
2）. When firms had higher levels of financial 
slack at the onset of the recession, they tended 
to have a worse decline in performance during 
the initial declining stage than companies with 
lower levels of financial slack. In addition, firms 
reducing their financial slack during the declin-
ing stage did not increase their performance at 
the recession’s later stage. Hence, financial slack 
at the beginning of the recession did not work 
as a buffer, and its reduction during the early 
stage did not lead to a higher performance turn-
Table 1  Performance Trend during Recession
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around. However, when squared terms of finan-
cial slack were introduced into the parameters, 
I identified a curvilinear relationship between 
financial slack reduction and performance 
improvements. So, too much or too little excess 
financial slack reduction may lead to slower per-
formance improvements. Therefore, this finding 
supported Hypothesis 2.
Instead of financial slack reduction measures, 
the linear and curvilinear effects of financial 
slack present at the onset of the recession were 
entered into the quadratic parameters and were 
examined for the strength of their effects on 
performance trajectories at the later stage of 
the recession （See Models 3, and 4）. In both 
cases, financial slack present at the onset had no 
curvilinear relationship with performance at the 
later stage. Therefore, the presence of financial 
slack at the onset of the recession was incon-
sequential to a firm’s performance at the later 
stage.
Control variables （i.e., firm size and the sever-
ity of the recession） had a mixed impact on the 
firms’ performance trajectories. The severity 
had a positive impact on performance recovery. 
Top executives who perceived the recession’s 
impact on their firm as severe tended to turn 
around their companies more rapidly than those 
who did not.
Table 2  Effect of Firm Factors on Performance during Recession
Rikkyo Business Review, No.9 （2016）　3-12
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Firms with excess financial slack were more 
likely to invest during the early stage of the 
recession. However, those investing too much 
financial slack were likely to have a slower 
performance turnaround. Furthermore, those 
investing too little financial slack were getting 
slower returns. In this study, I found that medi-
um levels of financial slack reduction tended to 
induce rapid performance improvements. This 
finding is consistent with most research on the 
slack‒innovation relationship. Future research 
should investigate the optimal levels of finan-
cial slack reduction during the early stage of a 
recession.
I also found that the presence of financial 
slack at the onset of the recession had a nega-
tive impact on performance trajectories at the 
early stage. This finding was identical to that 
of Latham and Braun （2008）. The slack‒per-
formance relationship was also not curvilinear. 
Therefore, having high levels of financial slack 
at the onset of a recession may shield manag-
ers from recessionary pressures and might slow 
down their responses when faced with a severe 
recession.
In this study, the presence of financial slack 
at the recession’s onset had insignificant impact 
on a firm’s performance at the later stage. This 
finding was contrary to that of Latham and 
Braun （2008）, who found that firms with high 
levels of financial slack at the onset of the IT 
recession had higher performance improve-
ments during the recovery stage. The differ-
ent results may stem from the rather different 
severities and depths of the IT recession and 
the Great Recession. The IT recession was 
rather mild and had a quick recovery in a few 
years. Furthermore, its impact was mainly on 
software firms in the U.S. The Great Recession, 
on the other hand, had severe effects not only 
on financial institutions but also on industries 
throughout the U.S. and the rest of the world. 
Future research should investigate if the con-
texts of different recessions tend to affect the 
slack‒performance relationship.
In this study, I examined the performance 
trends of about two years from the start of 
the Great Recession. Future research should 
be conducted on the time after the end of the 
Great Recession to investigate the impact of 
slack reduction on performance during recovery 
periods. Furthermore, I focused on the effect of 
a firm’s financial slack on performance because 
financial slack tends to be readily available to 
managers and immediately affects the firm’s 
performance. Other slacks, however （such as 
absorbed slack and recoverable slack）, affect 
performance after a few years. 
Future research should also examine the 
impact of slack reduction on a firm’s perfor-
mance in other industries. This study focused on 
one industry, electronics. Thus, more research 
is needed to further our understanding of the 
relationships between slack and performance 
during recessions.
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